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Abstract: 
 
This paper examines the impact of micro health insurance on poverty reduction in rural areas of 
Bangladesh. The research is based on household level primary data collected from the operating 
areas of the Grameen Bank during 2006. A number of outcome measures relating to poverty status 
are considered; these include household income, stability of household income via food sufficiency 
and ownership of non-land assets, and also the probability of being above or below the poverty line. 
The results show that micro health insurance has a positive association with all of these indicators, 
and this is statistically significant and quantitatively important for food sufficiency.  
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1. Introduction 
Microinsurance has been described as ‘the protection of low-income people against specific perils 
in exchange for regular premium payments proportionate to the likelihood and cost of the risk 
involved’ (Churchill 2006:12). Microcredit is the provision of collateral free small loans, especially 
to women, to enable them to develop household based micro enterprises. An important objective of 
the microcredit movement is to break the longstanding vicious circle of poverty; from low income, 
to low saving, to low investment, to low income ... and so on. The growth of microcredit is 
motivated by the failure of both traditional financial markets and the targeted programs of 
government owned financial institutions to meet the credit needs of the rural poor. The importance 
of microinsurance emanates from the limitations of conventional loan-based microcredit programs 
in protecting the poor from all sorts of vulnerabilities.  
 
Although microcredit has been shown to generate various beneficial outcomes, there is also 
evidence that not all sectors of the poor can benefit. One such group are those who experience 
severe health shocks, which reduce work capacity and investment and require a redirection of 
resources to the consumption of healthcare. Due to increased evidence that microcredit does not 
help the poorest poor, support has grown for supplementing microcredit with other services in order 
to improve the effectiveness of the programs. One such supplementary service is micro health 
insurance (MHI) to protect vulnerable people from health shocks when existing coping strategies 
fail.  In Bangladesh, the provision of health insurance via microcredit schemes is also motivated by 
the lack of any social health insurance schemes in the formal sector, and the fact that the 
government seems unable to meet the health care needs of the rural poor.   
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Grameen Bank1 (GB) has played the primary role in developing microcredit programs in 
Bangladesh. The organisation emerged from an action research project by Professor Muhammad 
Yunus in 1976 examining the possibility of providing banking services for the rural poor. GB as a 
microfinance institution (MFI) provide a number of services including loans and savings schemes, 
and it added a MHI scheme in the late 1990s, in order to protect its clients from health risks with the 
aim of preventing their economic downfall.  
 
These MHI schemes may contribute to reducing poverty via improvements in health as well as 
reducing the health risks of the insured.  Empirical evidence on whether these insurance schemes 
are meeting their objectives is important for policy decisions concerning expansion and replication 
of this type of insurance.  However, to date there has been very little research on the effects of 
adding MHI to microcredit. Mosley (2003) examined the effects of the MHI scheme of another 
microfinance institution known as BRAC (the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee). This 
study did not explicitly examine whether MHI contributes to reducing poverty, but instead it 
considered outcomes such as assets, household expenditure, current saving, educational expenditure 
and education level. The evidence was not conclusive as the study was conducted at a very early 
stage of the MHI program using a small sample. The other impact assessment studies on MHI have 
concentrated on process indicators, such as healthcare utilization and equality of access to 
healthcare in the Philippines (Dror et al., 2005, 2006); healthcare use and out of pocket expenditure 
in Senegal (Jutting, 2004); the utilization of healthcare and financial protection from health shocks 
in Tanzania (Msuya et al., 2007); and cost recovery in Rwanda (Schneider and Hanson, 2007). 
Thus, there is no good empirical evidence on whether the addition of a MHI scheme to microcredit 
reduces poverty.  
 
                                                
1 Grameen means ‘rural’ or ‘village’ in the Bangla language.  
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In this paper we examine whether the addition of MHI to the microcredit programs of GB have an 
effect on poverty. We consider four indicators relating to household poverty status: household 
income, stability of household income (via food sufficiency and ownership of non-land assets) and 
the probability of being above or below the poverty line. We use data collected from a primary 
survey of 329 households in three areas where GB operates microcredit programs. The areas are 
distinguished according to their experience of MHI: areas with at least five years experience of 
MHI, those with 2 years or less experience, and those where MHI is not available.  Our evidence is 
based on econometric analysis of the impact of placement of MHI.  The study finds an association 
between MHI and all of the poverty indicators, and this is statistically significant in the case of food 
sufficiency. In our discussion we consider some of the possible explanations for this finding.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background on microcredit, health and 
MHI programs in Bangladesh; section 3 illustrates the conceptual framework explaining the 
possible causal pathways through which adding MHI to microcredit can affect the poverty status of 
households; Section 4 describes the econometric methodology; Section 5 reports the results and 
Section 6 discusses them; Section 7 offers some conclusions. 
 
2. Background  
There has been a massive expansion in Grameen type microcredit in Bangladesh since the 1990s. 
The Palli Karma Sahayak Foundation is an apex organization for microcredit funding and capacity 
building; according to their figures, in December 2005 there were around 700 MFIs in Bangladesh 
with over 33 million members. The main players in the microfinance sector are GB, BRAC, ASA 
and Proshika. Some government departments and commercial banks also provide microcredit.  
 
Although microcredit generates various beneficial outcomes (Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Pitt et al., 
2003; Khandker, 2005; Gertler et al. 2009), there is evidence that those households who experience 
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severe health shocks are unable to reap much benefit from microcredit. Illness, especially chronic 
illness, of household members is the main reason that GB borrowers fail to rise above the poverty 
threshold (Tod, 1996; Wright, 2000). This is because ill health reduces work capacity and 
investment due to a redirection of resources to consumption of healthcare. Thus welfarists stress the 
value of adding auxiliary services to microcredit in order to improve the effectiveness of the 
programs (Dichter, 1996; Jani and Pedroni, 1997; Bhatt and Tang, 2001; Woller et al., 1999; Woller 
and Woodworth, 2001).  
 
Insurance may protect vulnerable people from risks and shocks. However, traditional health 
insurance markets are almost entirely absent in the rural areas of Bangladesh. There is no social 
health insurance scheme even in the formal sector in Bangladesh, and in addition the government 
has not been able to meet the health care needs of the rural poor despite having a well-established 
healthcare delivery network  
 
The constitutional commitment of the government of Bangladesh is to provide basic medical care to 
all of its citizens; they have invested substantially since independence to develop the health 
infrastructure and to strengthen health and family planning services with special attention to the 
rural population. Providing primary health care to attain ‘Health for All’ is the major thrust of the 
health program. There is a three tier mechanism for providing health care in rural areas: (i) 
domiciliary services by a Health Assistant and Family Welfare Assistant at the household level; (ii) 
Health and Family Welfare Centres at the union level2, and (iii) Upazila Health Complexes (UHCs) 
at the sub-district level. UHCs provide both outpatient and inpatient services including maternal and 
child health and family planning; they are the main centre for implementing the Essential Services 
Package which was designed to attain Health for All. In addition to public provision of healthcare, 
                                                
2 There are 482 ‘upazilas’ (or sub-districts) Bangladesh, which are the lowest level of administrative government. Each 
upazila is sub-divided into smaller local ‘unions’.  
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there is a large private sector in Bangladesh, that includes both not-for-profit and for-profit 
organisations; the former is relatively small and run by NGOs, MFIs and charitable institutions.  
 
Despite this infrastructure for healthcare delivery, the government has largely failed to meet the 
health care needs of the rural population and this is due mainly to supply side constraints. Firstly, 
problems in retaining doctors in UHCs due to poor working conditions; secondly, a lack of proper 
input mix and skill mix due to under-resourcing and recruitment problems; thirdly unfriendly and 
unapproachable behaviour of the health care providers which discourages contact from the local 
population; and finally the charging of unofficial fees. Thus, although there is under utilization in 
many UHCs, the majority of patients seek healthcare from private providers, especially from 
informal providers who often have no formal medical qualifications (BBS, 2006).  
 
In order to expand into areas of social protection not covered in conventional loan-based 
microfinance, and also to help supplement poor government provision of health care, GB set up a 
MHI scheme to protect its microcredit clients from health risks in order to ameliorate the economic 
risks that they face.  Under this scheme GB sells annually renewable prepaid insurance cards to its 
clients and also offers primary health care directly from its own health centres. The service 
comprises mainly curative care and maternity and child health care. Non-card holders can seek 
healthcare from these health centres but they pay a higher charge for the services compared to the 
insured cardholders. Following GB, some other MFIs in Bangladesh have also introduced MHI 
schemes with similar objectives.  In terms of the type of insurance provided, the GB scheme is 
largely pre-payment for health services, rather than a program that covers most catastrophic health 
costs. Thus it may be the case that the government provision, while inadequate, does provide some 
coverage for the more catastrophic needs while failing to provide basic health services. 
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3. Conceptual Framework 
 
A MHI scheme offering both curative and preventive healthcare and health promotion services may 
increase the health status of the participating households via increased health awareness, improved 
health practices, and increased utilization of formal healthcare (see Figure 1). Improved health 
status may lead to higher productivity, higher labour supply, fewer workdays lost and reduced 
healthcare expenditure. The first two can be regarded as ‘augmenting’ effects and the latter two as 
‘stabilization’ effects. 
 
Under augmenting effects it is assumed that improved health status leads to an increase in the 
efficiency of labour supply as well as actual labour supply which increases productivity, and 
thereby earnings, in the microenterprise3. The stabilization effects can be elaborated as follows. 
First, improved health status leads to lower income loss through reducing the workdays lost due to 
illness. Second, it reduces both direct and indirect health expenditures because healthcare utilization 
may be reduced due to improved health status4.  Thus, the household may maintain health care 
expenditure from regular income or savings. This may help the household to avoid borrowing or 
selling of productive assets to meet the medical needs of the household5, which may prevent falling 
incomes earned from microenterprise.  
 
In addition, the supplementation of microcredit with MHI may reduce the uncertainty of healthcare 
expenditure and thus raise investment in all forms of capital. If the household is insured against 
health risk, it may invest in high return riskier assets because it does not need to retain cash or to 
hold easily liquidable assets for precautionary purposes. It is worth mentioning that Kochar (2004) 
                                                
3 In addition, as in most cases the microentrepreneurs are women, they also tend to take care of sick children and adults 
in the household, therefore increased health status of household members reduces the time spent caring and thereby 
increases the supply of effective labour.  
4It is worth mentioning that this may happen only if there is a substantial improvement in health status, which may not 
occur in the short run. Thus, healthcare expenditure may not fall in the short run; rather, it may increase because 
insurance provides incentives to use more health care. 
5 Poor households sell various household assets like livestock, land and grain and take out loans to cover the financial 
costs of illness (Sauerborn et al., 1996). 
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finds, from a study in rural Pakistan, that overall savings of households rise in the expectation of 
future illness of adult males, but investments in productive assets decline. 
 
Thus, these two channels (improvement of health status and reduction in uncertainty regarding 
healthcare expenditure) may result in higher household income. When income rises above 
subsistence level, the household may increase investment in nutritional improvement, human capital 
and physical capital. This may also reduce vulnerability that may in turn lead to investment in high 
return assets. Moreover, surplus income may enhance social capital through increasing the strength 
of the solidarity of the group members, which may reduce the probability of drop out from the 
microcredit program. These effects together may lead the household to attain a higher income state 
in the long run, and thus it reduces the probability of a household being below the poverty line.  
 
 
4. Methodology 
Data  
We collected primary data from a quantitative household survey through a cross section design in 
2006. We chose to study the MHI component of GB because this MFI operates on a large scale in 
Bangladesh.  In June 2006, MHI was being operated in 32 of GB’s branches, of which 14 branches 
had the scheme for at least five years and 2 had MHI for two years or less. The GB microcredit and 
MHI programs are identical across the areas that we study. A description of the key features of the 
GB MHI scheme is given in Table 1.  
 
In order to construct a meaningful study design that would enable us to test causal relationships, GB 
branches were stratified into three distinct types: (i) GB1 - branches with at least five years 
experience of MHI; (ii) GB2 branches with one or two years experience; (iii) GB3 - branches 
without MHI. 
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A multi-stage sampling technique was applied. One GB branch was randomly selected from each of 
GB1 and GB2; they are Madhabpur and Pakutia respectively. Madhabpur is located at Singair 
upazila (sub-district) of Manikgonj district and Pakutai is at Nagarpor upazila of Tangail district.  
One GB branch (Joy Mantap) was selected from GB3. This branch was purposively selected from 
the same upazila (Singair) as Madhabpur, in order to make a meaningful comparison group. Note 
that there are 8 branches of GB in Singair upazila and a MHI scheme has been operating in its three 
unions (Madhabpur, Shaharil and Jamsaha) since 1996. Among the remaining five unions where 
GB has not yet placed its MHI scheme, Joy Mantap is adjacent to Madhabpur and they are 
connected by road. It is worth mentioning that GB has decided to introduce its MHI scheme into 
Joy Mantap in the near future, which may reduce program placement bias in this design.  It also 
may be noted that microcredit was placed at Madhabpur and Joy Matap in 1983 and at Pakutaia in 
1986. A MHI scheme was placed at Madhabpur and Pakutaia in 1996 and 2004 respectively. 
 
A list of all the villages holding at least one female centre of GB was prepared for each selected 
area6. In the second stage, 2 villages from each area were selected randomly. Thus, a total of 6 (3x2) 
villages were selected.  In the third stage, two female microcredit centres were selected randomly 
from each village where more than two microcredit centres existed. Some villages had only one 
credit centre, in that case it was selected.  Note that each credit centre consists of 40-50 microcredit 
members and they usually live in a particular area of the village. A list of current GB microcredit 
member households was made in each selected GB loan centre, using information obtained from 
respective branch offices of GB.  We attempted to interview all the eligible member households in 
the selected microcredit centres of each sampled village, in order to control for sample selection 
bias. 
 
                                                
6 Since about 96 percent of existing GB members are female, we selected only the female microcredit centres. 
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We used a set of questionnaires to collect both household level and village level information. We 
finalised the survey instruments after incorporating comments and suggestions from a number of 
experts who were sent a preliminary draft of the questionnaires, as well as feedback from two 
rounds of piloting. We employed a team of six female surveyors comprising of four field 
investigators, one field supervisor and one quality controller to conduct the survey.  Each of the 
members of the survey team had completed their Masters degree and was experienced enough to 
conduct the field survey. We provided them with five days training on the purpose and objectives of 
the study and on the use of the survey instruments.  
 
Female microcredit members were the key respondents, however, some questions (income, 
expenditure, assets etc.) were asked to household heads and these are predominantly male.  The 
village level information was collected from the offices of the Union Councils and key informants. 
The data was entered in SPSS v10 and converted to Stata v9 for analysis.  
 
Method 
 One of the major challenges in estimating the impact of a program (like MHI) using non-
experimental data is to deal with endogeneity caused by heterogeneity in unobservable individual 
characteristics of the participants and non-participants, which may influence both the decision to 
participate in the scheme and the outcome. Random assignment of individuals into a treatment 
group and a control group can balance the heterogeneity in unobservable individual characteristics 
and thus eliminate bias. However, random assignment is not possible here; hence it is necessary to 
choose an empirical model, which can control for endogeneity. 
 
Following the empirical literature on health insurance and microcredit (Pitt and Khandker, 1998; 
Waters, 1999; Nanda, 1999; Yip and Berman, 2001; Jowett et al., 2003; Trujillo, 2003; Khandker 
and Faruqee, 2003; Jutting, 2004; Jowett et al., 2004) we consider a structural equation and a 
reduced form equation to estimate the outcomes of the interest. 
 12
 
In the structural equation:  
 
ijijijij AXy εδβ ++=                                                                           (1) 
 
ijy  is the outcome of interest (household income, stabilization of household income or probability 
of being in poverty) for household i in village j)7. ijX  is a vector of observed individual, household 
and village characteristics (education, age, duration of membership in MHI and so on). ijA  is a 
binary variable where ijA =1 if household i  of program village j  participates in MHI and ijA = 0, 
otherwise; and ijε  is the stochastic error term. The estimate of δ  will give the unbiased effect of 
MHI on the outcome y only if ijA  is an exogenous variable.  
 
In the reduced form (or participation) equation:  
 
ijijijij ZXA µφβ ++=                                                                             (2) 
 
ijX  is as defined in equation (1); ijZ  is a distinct set of household or village characteristics that 
affect only participation in the scheme ( ijA ), but not the outcome )( ijy conditional on ijA ; and ijµ  
is the stochastic error term. Endogeneity arises when A  and ε  (or ε  and µ ) are correlated, 
resulting in biased estimates of δ .  
 
While conditioning on participation is the commonly used method for analyzing the causal effect of 
health insurance as evidenced in the literature, this method is not appropriate for our research for a 
number of the reasons.  First, MHI may produce a lot of spill-over effects, because the scheme 
offered by GB is different from a traditional three-party (the insurer, the insured and health service 
                                                
7 The exact specification of the model (linear, binary probit or ordered probit) depends on the nature of the outcome.  
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providers) health insurance system. As well as pre-paid insurance cards, GB MHI provides 
healthcare directly to their clients through establishing health centres. In addition, GB MHI offers 
health promotion services to all the microcredit members living under the catchment areas of the 
health centre regardless of their participation in MHI8. Moreover, the uninsured can seek healthcare 
from the health centres by paying the standard fees.  If these spill-over effects are not taken into 
account, the impact of MHI will be severely underestimated. Second, there was a very high 
enrolment rate in MHI at GB1 (96%). Since there are very few observations on the non-participant 
group, the estimation of equation (1) may not give sensible findings.  
 
Thus, in what follows we focus on outcomes conditioned on placement of the program, rather than 
participation in the program. Available empirical literature on this method falls mainly into two 
groups. One group has compared the program group with a comparison group where the program 
was in the pipeline (Chase, 2002; Galasso and Ravallion, 2004). The other group has compared the 
program group with a comparison group where the program has not been placed at the time of 
survey (Amin et al., 1996; Hadi, 2002). The placement model can be written as follows 
 
ijijijij PXy ελβ ++=                                                                        (3) 
 
y  and X  are as defined previously; P represents  program status where 1=P   if the household is 
drawn from a program area where MHI has been operating for at least five years (GB1); and 0=P  
if the household is drawn from the comparison area where MHI was not placed at the time of survey 
(GB3). The estimate of λ  measures the average treatment effect of MHI. Measuring average 
treatment effect rather than average effect of treatment on the treated is sensible because non-
participants may also benefit from the availability of MHI due to spill-over effects. 
 
                                                
8 It is also reasonable to expect that the benefits of health promotion will extend beyond microcredit members to any of 
local people.  
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The major concern in this method is to control for program placement bias (the particular features 
that attract an organization to place the program in an area) and geographical heterogeneity, which 
may affect the outcomes. Social programs like MHI are rarely placed randomly; rather placement 
depends on both demand and supply side factors. The best way to ameliorate the effects of program 
placement bias is to select a suitable comparison area, and to do this we took the following 
measures. First, selecting the program area (GB1) and control area (GB3) from the same small 
geographical region to reduce geographical heterogeneity; second, choosing the control area where 
there is potential for placing the program in the near future to reduce the supply side bias of 
program placement; and third, conducting a survey to see whether eligible households in the control 
area would be willing to be insured if MHI was placed in their village, to control for demand side 
bias. Note that willingness to enrol in an MHI scheme was 98 percent in GB3, which was very 
similar to actual enrolment in GB1 (96%). 
 
In addition, we used a similar method to select the households from the program area and control 
area. It should also be noted that we conducted the survey on female microcredit members and this 
group is likely to be relatively homogeneous across the program and control areas.  
 
Poverty measurement indicators 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the impact of MHI on poverty status we consider four 
different outcome measures which relate to poverty: household income, household non-land assets, 
food sufficiency and the probability of being above or below the poverty line. These outcomes can 
also be related to the mechanisms illustrated in Figure 1. Household income relates directly to boxes 
5, 8 and 16, which reflect enhanced income via health improvements. Food sufficiency and 
ownership of non-land assets relate to boxes 6 and 7, where income is stabilized via reduced work 
days lost and lower health care expenditure leading to increased investments in all forms of capital; 
in addition food sufficiency contributes directly to higher nutritional status (box 10). The final 
 15
poverty measure is a direct reflection of boxes 8 and 16 (higher income, which crucially may then 
be above subsistence level).  
 
Clearly we are using outcome measures at one point in time, derived from a cross section survey, to 
reflect the results of the dynamic processes outline in Figure 1. We might expect that some of our 
indicators will react more quickly to the potential beneficial effects of MHI than others; for example 
it seems reasonable to expect that food sufficiency and per capita income may be the first to change 
whereas accumulation of non-land assets and increasing incomes above the poverty line may take 
longer to achieve.  
 
Total household income is constructed from a series of questions on all sources of income of all 
members of the household in the last 12 months9. In the analysis we use the log of age and sex 
adjusted per capita income10. Household non-land assets and food sufficiency are used to proxy for 
the stability of income. Food sufficiency is an appropriate proxy because it varies with fluctuations 
in income level. Also ownership of non-land assets are suitable because poor people usually depend 
on selling these liquidable assets to cope with any income shock. Respondents were asked to 
classify their household food consumption for the year as either: in deficit for the whole year, 
sometimes in deficit, neither in deficit nor surplus, or in surplus for the whole year. There were very 
few observations in the ‘deficit for the whole year’ category, so this group is merged with the 
‘sometimes deficit’ group to create a 3 point ordered food sufficiency scale, where 0 = in deficit, 1 
= neither deficit nor surplus and 2 = in surplus. Information on ownership of non-land assets was 
constructed from a series of questions about all non-land assets and their estimated current market 
price. We use the current value of all household non-land assets whether they contribute to 
                                                
9 We have measured gross income rather than net income (income retained after deduction of production costs) because 
the respondents find it difficult to state the costs of production accurately. 
10 The weights used to construct age and sex adjusted household size are : 1.0 for males aged over 18 years, 0.9 for 
females aged over 18; 0.94 for males aged 13-18, 0.83 for females aged over 13-18; 0.67 and 0.52 for a children aged 7-
11 and 4-6 respectively;  0.32  for   toddlers aged 1-3; and 0.05 for infants. These weights are based on a South Indian 
dietary survey and are also used by Townsend (1994).  
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household income or not.  As for per capita income we have used age and sex adjusted household 
size to measure per capita non-land assets. 
  
We use the ‘cost of basic needs’ approach to measure the poverty line; here the cost of a normative 
bundle of goods needed to meet minimum nutritional requirements plus the costs of non-food basic 
need items is defined as poverty line expenditure. Following Ravallion and Sen (1994) we use 2112 
calories and 58 of grams protein as the minimum daily calorie requirement of an adult for the food 
poverty line, and then take 35 percent of the food poverty line income as the appropriate non-food 
allowance. We then define households as falling below (=0) or above (=1) the poverty line 
according to these criteria.  
 
 
 
5. Findings 
Descriptive statistics 
A total of 329 households were surveyed of which 136 were from GB1, 85 from GB2 and 108 from 
GB3. The overall response rate in the survey was 73 percent (75, 68 and 73 percent in GB1, GB2 
and GB3 respectively)11. There was little variation in response rates between the insured and the 
uninsured. The participation in MHI among the households interviewed in the survey was 82 
percent (96 percent at GB1 and 59 percent at GB2). Respondents in GB3 were asked whether they 
would like to enrol in MHI if it was placed in their area. The willingness to participate in MHI at 
GB3 was 98 percent. 
 
There is no significant difference in socio-demographic features, apart from duration of 
membership in microcredit, between the program area (GB1) and the control area (GB3) (see Table 
2). Also there is no difference in main sources of income, general infrastructure and occurrence of 
                                                
11 The main reason for non-response is that we could not interview some households due either to absence of the key 
respondent or unwillingness to take part in the survey; this was largely because the survey was conducted during 
harvesting season where a number of household members are away from home for long periods.  In order to reduce this 
problem one repeat visit was made to absent households. It is worth mentioning that respondents were not pressurized 
nor offered motivation to take part in the interview. 
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natural calamities. In addition household health care expenditure and workdays lost do not differ 
significantly between GB1 and GB3, which may cast doubt on some of the causal pathways 
described in Figure 1. There is a significant difference in most of these features (duration of 
membership in microcredit program, male and female education, and age and sex structure) 
between GB1 and GB2 (see Table 2). As per the design of the study there is a significant difference 
in duration of membership in MHI between these two areas. At GB1, about 64 percent of the 
insured had at least 5 years experience of MHI (the average experience is about 6 years) and at 
GB2, 96 percent had only one years experience.   
 
Almost all the microentrepreneurs were aged between 17 and 64 years irrespective of the sample 
areas. Most of them were of reproductive age (15-49 years). More than 90 percent were married in 
all the sampled areas. The majority of the microentrepreneurs, irrespective of the sample areas, had 
no formal education. But the formal education rate was higher in GB2 compared to other areas. The 
majority of the microentrepreneurs in GB2 and GB3 had household based self-employment12; and 
this was around 44 percent for the microentrepreneurs in GB1. A good number (28%) of 
microentrepreneurs of this area had small businesses. Some microentrepreneurs (18%, 22%, and 
17% for GB1, GB2, and GB3 respectively) were not directly involved in any economic activity. 
Rather, they gave the money borrowed from MFIs to someone else either within or outside the 
household. Microentrepreneurs were themselves the household head in some cases (15%, 14%, and 
10% at the GB1, GB2, GB3 respectively), but the vast majority of households were male headed.  
Like microentrepreneurs, the majority of the household heads had no formal education. Small 
business, farming and day labour were the major occupations of household heads in all the areas.  
 
There is substantially higher mean per capita income and per capita non-land assets in GB1 
compared to GB3 or GB2 (see Appendix Table-A1); the differences between GB1 and GB2 and 
                                                
12 Note that livestock fattening, poultry feeding, farming, tailoring, etc. fall in this category. 
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between GB1 and GB3 are significant at the 1 percent level (see Table 3). The data shows that the 
majority of the households do not have food deficit irrespective of MHI placement status (see 
Appendix Table-A2). Although food surplus status is higher in GB1 compared to GB2 or GB3, the 
differences are not significant at any conventional level (see Table 3).  
 
 
According to the cost of basic needs method per capita annual poverty line expenditure was US 
$155.77 in GB1 and US $156.05 in GB3. Table 4 shows the percentage of GB member-households 
above the poverty line. A substantially higher proportion of households are above the poverty line 
in GB1 compared to GB3 and this difference is significant at the 10 percent level.  
 
 
Multivariate analysis 
The regression results are presented in Table 5. The estimation technique is chosen depending on 
the form of the dependent variable. Models (i) and (ii) are estimated by OLS for the continuous 
variables log per capita income and log per capita non-land assets, since the histograms of the log-
linear data for both of these variables are approximately normal13. An ordered probit model is 
estimated for food sufficiency level (iii); where food deficit = 0, neither deficit nor surplus = 1 and 
surplus = 2. Model (iv) is a binary probit for the probability of being above the poverty line, where 
household living below poverty line = 0 and above poverty line = 1. Table 5 reports the coefficient 
estimates for the probit models and marginal effects are reported in the Appendix, Table A3.  
 
The following control variables are included in all of these models. Education level of the 
household head and the microentrepreneur (both measured as completed years of education); three 
dummy variables for the occupation status of the household head: high (business and service), 
medium (farming, small business, and boatman), and low (day labour, rickshaw/van pulling, 
fishing, household based self-employment and begging), which is the reference category; 
                                                
13 In further analyses we also applied robust regression and quintile regression to these models and the results do not differ 
significantly from the OLS results reported here.  
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proportion of income earners in the household; number of individuals from the household living 
abroad (who tend to send remittances to the family in Bangladesh); amount of owned cultivable 
land (in decimals14); amount of owned homestead land (in decimals); years duration of membership 
in the microcredit program; number of persons in the household with a chronic disease. In addition, 
we have controlled for village literacy rate. Our expectations are that all of the control variables, 
other than number of people with a chronic disease, will have a positive association with each of the 
dependent variables.  
 
Looking across the columns in Table 5, there are three variables that appear to consistently 
contribute positively to the four outcome measures; these are household head having a high grade 
occupation, the number of household members living abroad and the amount of cultivable land 
owned by the household. The amount of owned homestead land effects three of the four outcomes 
but not the probability of being above the poverty line. The education of the household head and the 
length of membership in the microcredit scheme affect two of the four outcomes. None of the other 
variables have a significant effect across all of the outcomes. The remaining coefficient estimates 
all have the expected signs in all of the models. Quantitatively the number of household members 
living abroad and the household head having a high grade occupation make the largest contribution 
to all four outcomes; for example from Table A3 we see that the household head having a high 
grade occupation increases the probability of being in food surplus by 0.142 percentage points and 
increases the probability of being above the poverty line by 0.209 percentage points. In all cases the 
coefficient on MHI placement status is positive and it is statistically significant in determining food 
sufficiency. The marginal effects in Table A3 show that being in an area where MHI has been 
available for at least five years increases the changes of being in food surplus by 0.086 percentage 
points. This is a relatively large effect, being similar in size to having another person from the 
household living abroad and second only to the household head having a high grade occupation.  
                                                
14 Decimals are a standard unit of area in Bangladesh; 100 decimals are equal to one acre. 
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In terms of the diagnostic statistics, the models appear to be well specified; each of them is jointly 
significant at the 1 percent level according to the F- and Wald tests and there is no evidence of 
misspecification according to the RESET tests. The explanatory power of the models is respectable 
for this type of cross section analysis with primary data. In addition to explore the effects possible 
collinearities between the explanatory variables, each variable was excluded in turn and this made 
little difference to the existing coefficient estimates.  
 
 
6. Discussion  
Our results suggest that MHI placement has a significant beneficial effect on food sufficiency but is 
not significant in contributing to our other poverty indicators. There are a number of possible 
reasons for finding a statistically insignificant association with income, non-land assets and the 
probability of being above the poverty line. Firstly, MHI may take time to generate a significant 
impact on household income via improvements in health status and thus the dynamic effects may 
not have been observed in our cross section analysis, where the average time of program placement 
in GB1 was only 6 years. It is reasonable to expect that food sufficiency may react before the 
ownership of non-land assets and rising above the poverty line, which rely on an accumulation of 
surplus income over time; however, via these dynamic arguments we may expect per capita 
incomes to rise relative quickly as a result of MHI placement and our evidence suggests they do not. 
Secondly, the result may be due to the type of insurance and health care provided through this MHI 
scheme. GB does not provide secondary or tertiary healthcare from its health centres and although it 
maintains a referral mechanism for the higher levels of healthcare, this does not function effectively 
as we observed during the survey15. As was seen in Table 2, health care expenditure and workdays 
lost (the main determinants of stabilization of household income in Figure 1) did not differ 
                                                
15 Officially there is a provision that an insured household will receive up to TK.2000 (about US $29) annually as 
referral (hospitalization) benefits. This benefit was provided via external funding from the ILO. However the fund has 
been exhausted so the benefit is not longer provided in practice.  
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significantly between the program area (GB1) and comparison area (GB3). The adverse effects of 
protection against moral hazard may be a possible reason for the former. Co-payments are used to 
deter over utilisation of health care by the insured, but qualitative information collected during our 
survey revealed that these co-payments, although relatively small, are a strong deterrent to these 
very poor households, who then prefer to use informal health care providers who may offer credit 
terms, even if the total cost of health care is then higher.   
 
Of course one possible further explanation is that in fact the addition of MHI to microcredit does 
not contribute to most poverty indicators. However, we should be wary before reaching this 
conclusion because while our study uses primary data collected expressly for assessing the impact 
of MHI, and applies appropriate methods for analysing the data, there are still some limitations 
which largely arise from time and resource constraints16. First, although panel data or repeated cross 
section data is the most suitable for analysing dynamic outcomes, our study uses a single cross 
section of households. In addition, our study does not provide evidence on whether MHI can reach 
the poorest of the poor because we used a sample of microcredit members and not the population as 
a whole. It has been shown that microcredit is not always able to reach the ultra poor (Amin and 
Topa, 2003 Navajas et al., 2000) but they are clearly a key group for policy concerns.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This study has outlined the causal mechanisms by which adding MHI to microcredit schemes can 
contribute to improving the poverty status of households. We have evaluated this in the context of 
Grameen Bank, the largest microcredit organisation in Bangladesh. Our results show a positive 
association between MHI placement and household income, owner of non-land assets, food 
                                                
16 There was no external research funding for this study. 
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sufficiency and reduction of poverty. The results are statistically significant for the determination of 
food sufficiency and here they are quantitatively important. A number of reasons have been 
suggested for our findings, which include problems in detecting long-term effects with our cross 
section data as well as shortcomings of the MHI scheme in question, including a lack of proper 
referral services and the adverse effects of protection against moral hazard. Given the former 
problem it may not be sensible to draw generalized conclusions from our findings. Nevertheless, the 
study makes an important contribution to the literature as it is the only comprehensive evidence on 
the impact of MHI on poverty reduction.  
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Table-1:  A picture of the key features of the MHI scheme of GB   
 
Key features Grameen Kalyan of GB 
  
Type of organization 
 
• Insurer as well as a health service provider. 
Area coverage • December 2008: 39 unions of 25 sub-districts of 10 districts1. The program is identical  
 
Mechanisms for providing 
health services 
• Mainly through static clinics. 
• Also via mobile clinics, satellite clinics and domiciliary visits (by the health workers).  
• Limited emergency services through its static clinics  
• Referral services through making agreement with some hospitals. 
 
Technical staff •  An MBBS (Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery) doctor. 
• A female DMF (Diploma in Medical Faculty) doctor. 
•  An office manger, a female paramedic (RH), a laboratory technician and six community 
health assistants. 
• Some Trained Traditional Birth Attendants (TTBA) trained by Grameen Kalyan. 
 
Categories  of services covered 
 
• Preventive care including antenatal care (ANC)  
•  Curative care (mainly outpatient care). 
• All the basic diagnostic services including ultra-sonography 
• Some health promotion activities 
Type of curative services 
provided 
• Essential Services Package (ESP) including safe delivery.  
Enrolment status 
 
• Voluntary 
Proof of enrolment 
Affiliation unit 
• Insurance card 
• Household. The program is identical for all enrolees (i.e. the same level of premium and 
the same benefit package is applicable for every household). 
Eligibility criterion 
 
• GB member households or any villagers living within an 8 km radius of each health 
centre. 
Access of non-insured 
households to curative care 
• Yes 
Premium  • Annual premium (covering up to 6 members) 2 
§ For a GB member family: TK.120 (US $1.74) 
§  For a non member family: TK.150 (US $2.17)  
• Average daily wage 
§ Male: TK.90 (US $1.30) 
§ Female:  TK.60 (US $0.87) 
Benefit package for the card 
holders  
• Co-payment:  
§ Medical consultation fee for a card holder: TK.10 (US $0.14)   
§ Medical consultation fee for a non-card holder: TK.25 (US $0.36) 
• Discount:  Discount for basic medicine3 on MRP: 25%, for pathological tests on listed 
price: 30-35%, and for referred consultation visit: 50%. 
• Hospitalization benefit: Annually up to 2000TK (US $29) for a family. 
• Free: Annual basic check up for head of the family; immunization against six-diseases, 
domiciliary visits by health assistants. 
 
Additional health services 
package 
• School health package, Eye Mega Camp for cataract operations, and regular cataract 
operation programs. 
 
Financing mechanism • An initial endowment fund of Grameen Bank. 
•  Revenue generation from co-payment. 
 
Cost recovery rate • 100% (including the managerial costs and over head costs of Regional Office and Head 
Office) in most of the old health centre. 
  
Source: Hamid et al., 2005; Ahmed et al., 2005; and various official documents of SSS and Grameen Kalyan of GB. 
Note: 1.      There are 64 districts in Bangladesh. 
2. TK.20 is charged for each additional member. 
         3.       Basic medicine: 15 essential medicines are enlisted in the schedule of Government of Bangladesh. 
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Table-2: Socio-demographic characteristics of the sampled population 
 
Key features  GB1 GB2 GB3 Difference 
between 
GB1 and GB2 
Difference 
between 
GB1 and GB3 
 
Membership rate (%) of households in 
GB microcredit program 
 
 
 
 34 
 
32 
 
33 
 
0.02 0.01 
Average duration (in year) of 
membership in microcredit program 
 
 
9.62  
(6.95) 
6.42 
(6.05) 
6.84 
(6.25) 
3.19*** 2.77*** 
 
Average length of membership in MHI  
program 
 
 
 
 
6.01 
(2.96) 
 
1.00 
(0.20) 
 
- 
 
5.02*** 
- 
Average education level (male)  2.97 
(3.16) 
4.21 
(3.86) 
2.97 
(3.43) 
-1.24*** 0.00 
Average education level (female)  2.28 
(2.73) 
2.80 
(3.33) 
2.23 
(2.95) 
-0.51* 0.05 
Average household size  4.84 
(1.39) 
4.90 
(1.72) 
4.62 
(1.3) 
-0.06 0.23 
Male population (%)  50.91 44.84 51.50 0.06** -.01 
Female population (%)  49.09 55.16 48.50 -0.06** 0.01 
Average age   25.37 
(18.94) 
27.45 
(20.19) 
26.74 
(19.29) 
-2.08* -1.38 
Average wage (male) in USD  
 
1.3 
(0.90) 
 
1.4 
(0.93) 
 
1.2 
(0.97) 
-0.01 0.01 
Average wage (female) in USD  0.85 
(0.81) 
0.86 
(0.76) 
0.83 
(0.80) 
-0.01 0.02 
No. of MFIs working  5 6 5   
Note: 1. T-statistics are used to test the significance of the difference between the study group and the control cohort. 
          2. *** indicates significant at the 1% level, **5% level, * 10% level.  
          3. Magnitudes in round parentheses are standard deviation.  
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Table-3: Mean/ proportional difference in different poverty indicators between different groups of GB 
members 
 
Different indicators of poverty  
measurement 
 
 
Difference between 
GB1 and GB2 
Difference between
GB1 and GB3 
Difference between 
GB2 and GB3 
Mean per capita income  82.07*** 102.32*** 20.24 
Mean value of per capita non-land 
assets 
 81.50*** 65.33*** -16.16 
Proportional difference in surplus 
of food 
 13.53 18.14 4.61 
Note: 1. T-statistics are used to test the significance of the difference between the study group and the control cohort. 
          2. *** indicates significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level and * significant at the 10% level.  
         3. Two-tailed test is considered for each case. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table-4: Percentage of households living above poverty line by MHI status 
 
Different groups of GB  members  Percentage of household above poverty level 
GB1 (established MHI) 
 
 
 
 
80.88  
(110) 
 
GB3 (no MHI) 
 
 
 
 
69.44  
(75) 
 
Proportional difference (in percentage) 
between GB1 and GB3 
 11.44* 
Note:  1. T-statistics are used to test the significance of the difference between the study group and the control cohort. 
           2. Figures in parentheses are the number of observations. 
           3. *** indicates significant at the 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. 
           4. Two-tailed test is considered. 
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Table 5: Regression results  
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
 
OLS OLS  
ordered 
probit 
probit  
 
Log of (annual)  
per capita income 
Log  of per capita  
non-land assets 
Food sufficiency:  
(deficit = 0, neutral 
= 1, surplus = 2)  
Poverty status  
(0 = below poverty 
line and 1 = above) 
Education  of the household 
head (years) 
0.026*** 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.023) 
0.091*** 
(0.028) 
0.062 
(0.038) 
Household head in medium 
grade occupation 
0.155*** 
(0.061) 
0.215 
(0.140) 
0.047 
(0.171) 
0.216 
(0.204) 
Household head in high grade 
occupation 
0.285*** 
(0.084) 
0.538*** 
(0.212) 
0.532** 
(0.245) 
1.41*** 
(0.478) 
Education  of the 
microentrepreneur 
0.012 
(0.014) 
0.067** 
(0.030) 
0.028 
(0.038) 
0.051 
(0.058) 
The ratio of income earners 
to household size 
0.182 
(0.158) 
0.663** 
(0.322) 
0.089 
(0.412) 
0.198 
(0.540) 
No. of persons from 
household living abroad 
0.480*** 
(0.088) 
0.595*** 
(0.136) 
0.399* 
(0.224) 
1.021*** 
(0.378) 
Owned cultivable land 
(decimals)  
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
Owned homestead land 
(decimals) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.021*** 
(0.008) 
-0.005 
(0.009) 
Membership in GB 
microcredit (years)  
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.016* 
(0.010) 
0.042*** 
(0.013) 
0.013 
(0.017 
No. of chronic diseased 
persons 
-0.051* 
(0.030) 
-0.066 
(0.064) 
-0.001 
(0.089) 
0.060 
(0.128) 
Village literacy rate (%) 0.006 
(0.055) 
0.021 
(0.096) 
-0.004 
(0.050) 
-0.037 
(0.062) 
MHI status (1= established 
MHI, 0 = no MHI) 
0.110 
(0.169) 
0.171 
(0.285) 
0.398* 
(0.236) 
0.122 
(0.282) 
Constant 4.775** 
(2.050) 
2.671 
(3.533) 
- 1.258 
(2.457) 
Cut point 1  
  0.504 (1.955) 
 
Cut point 2  
  
2.241 
(1.952) 
 
 
observations 
244 244 244 
244 
 
F statistics 15.54*** 7.38***   
Wald chi-squared   83.75*** 46.62*** 
R-squared 0.421 0.268   
Pseudo R-squared   0.152 
0.166 
 
RESET F(3, 224) =  0.43 
Prob > F = 0.735 
F( 3, 224) =1.86 
Prob > F = 0.123 
chi2(  1) = 0.21 
Prob > chi2 = 0.644 
chi2( 1) =  0.67 
Prob > chi2 = 0.412 
 
Note: 1. *** indicates significant at the 1% level, ** 5% and * 10%. 
          2. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors.  
3, Coeffcients reprted here for probit and ordered pribit modekls Marginal effects are shown in Appendix Table A3.  
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Figure 1: Potential effects of adding MHI to microcredit 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table-A1: Summary statistics of different poverty indicators 
  
Different groups of GB 
members 
 
 
Mean per capita  income 
(in US $) 
Mean per capita 
non-land assets 
         (in US $) 
 
 
GB-1 ( established MHI) 
 
 
 
 
342.67 (174.63) 
[136] 
 
223.49 (203.44) 
[136] 
GB-2 ( new MHI)   
 
260.60 (134.96) 
[85] 
141.99 (106.24) 
[85] 
GB-3 (without MHI)  
 
240.35 (121.44) 
[108] 
158.15 (127.07) 
[108] 
GB (Total)  
 
287.88 (155.59) 
[329] 
180.99 (162.82) 
[329] 
Note: 1. Magnitudes in round parentheses are standard errors.  
          2. Magnitudes in the square parentheses are the number of observations. 
 
 
 
Table-A2: Percentage distribution of households by food sufficiency level  
 
Different groups of GB 
members 
 
 
 
GB-1 
(established MHI) 
 
GB-2 
( new MHI) 
 
GB-3 
(without MHI) 
Deficit in whole year  2.21 (3) 7.06 (6) 5.56 (6) 
Sometimes deficit  22.06 (30) 31.76 (27) 32.41 (35) 
Neither deficit nor 
surplus 
 49.26 (67) 48.24 (41) 53.70 (58) 
Surplus  26.47 (36 ) 12.94 (11) 8.33 (9) 
Total 
 
 
100.00 
(136) 
100.00 
(85) 
100.00 
(108) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are the number of observations.  
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Table-A3: Marginal effects for the ordered probit and probit models in Table 5.  
 
Food sufficiency level 
 
 
Food Deficit 
= 0 
 
neither deficit nor 
surplus = 1 
 
 
surplus = 2 
 
Poverty status 
(0 = under 
poverty line, 1 
=   above) 
Education  of the household head (years) -.030*** 
(0.009) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.020*** 
(0.006) 
0.016 
(0.010) 
Household head in medium grade occupation -.015 
(0.055) 
0.005 
(0.018) 
0.010 
(0.037) 
0.056 
(0.053) 
Household head in high grade occupation -.148** 
(0.058) 
0.005 
(0.025) 
0.142* 
(0.075) 
0.209*** 
(0.038) 
Education  of the microentrepreneur -.009 
(0.012) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
0.013 
(0.015) 
The ratio of income earners to household size -.028 
(0.134) 
0.009 
(0.043) 
0.020 
(0.091) 
0.051 
(0.140) 
No. of persons from household living abroad -.129* 
(0.073) 
0.041 
(0.027) 
0.088* 
(0.050) 
0.264*** 
(0.096) 
Owned cultivable land (decimals)  
-.002*** 
(0.001) 
4.95x10-4 ** 
(2.6x10-4 ) 
0.001** 
(4.3x10-4) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
Owned homestead land (decimals) -.007*** 
(0.003) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Membership in GB microcredit (years)  -.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
No. of chronic diseased persons 2.988x10-4 
(0.029) 
-9.57x10-5 
(0.009) 
-2.03x10-4 
(0.019) 
0.016 
(0.033) 
Village literacy rate (%) .001 
(0.016) 
-3.71x10-4 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.011) 
-0.010 
(0.016) 
MHI status (1= established MHI, 0 = no MHI) -.130* 
(0.078) 
0.045 
(0.030) 
0.086* 
(0.051) 
0.032 
(0.074) 
Note:  1.marginal effects for dummy variables evaluated for discrete a change from 0 to 1 
          2. *** indicates significant at the 1% level, ** 5% level, and * 10% level. 
          3. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
 
 
